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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
Andrew Murphy* and Laura Zanzig** 
Abstract: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires plaintiffs to 
exhaust all available administrative appeals before challenging an agency’s action in court. 
Washington courts describe exhaustion requirements, thresholds, and exceptions with varying 
degrees of consistency and frequent muddled overlap. Despite the fact that administrative 
exhaustion widely impacts Washington litigants, the secondary literature on the topic is fairly 
sparse. And, given the doctrine’s confusing and harsh nature, it can bar judicial review of valid 
claims. This article aims to address both of these issues. First, we offer a comprehensive review 
of the doctrine as it currently stands, with the intent of assisting Washington lawyers navigating 
this tricky area of law. Second, we propose that Washington courts protect valid claims and 
preserve the integrity of administrative processes by equitably tolling the statute of limitations 
while a plaintiff pursues administrative remedies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The administrative exhaustion doctrine is well established in 
Washington.1 The doctrine generally requires a plaintiff to exhaust all 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.2 Substantial 
policy interests produce a strong bias in favor of the exhaustion doctrine. 
                                                      
* Litigation attorney, Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson P.S.; J.D., University of Washington School 
of Law, Class of 2013.  
** Law Clerk to the Honorable John C. Coughenour, United States District Court, Western District 
of Washington (2015–present); Law Clerk to the Honorable Marlin J. Appelwick, Washington State 
Court of Appeals, Division One (2013–2015); J.D., University of Washington School of Law, Class 
of 2013. Both authors are grateful to Michael Scott and Mary Crego Peterson for their thoughtful 
influence on this article. 
 1. S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n for Pres. of Neighborhood Safety & Env’t v. King Cty., 101 
Wash. 2d 68, 73, 677 P.2d 114, 117 (1984). 
2. Id. 
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Exhaustion: (1) prevents premature interruption of the administrative 
process; (2) allows the agency to develop the factual background 
necessary for its decision; (3) allows the agency to exercise its expertise; 
(4) provides a more efficient process; (5) protects agency autonomy by 
allowing it to correct its own errors; and (6) protects agency autonomy by 
ensuring individuals are not encouraged to ignore agency procedure by 
resorting to the courts.3 
However, not every claim is subject to the exhaustion requirement; 
rather, there are certain conditions precedent that must be satisfied before 
the requirement attaches.4 In other words, if any condition precedent is 
absent, exhaustion is not required. Even where the requirement attaches 
to a claim, a plaintiff may also be excused for failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies if the court finds that an exception applies.5 
Specifically, courts may excuse the failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies if fairness and practicality outweigh exhaustion’s substantial 
policy interests.6 
I.  EXHAUSTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A CLAIM UNLESS 
FOUR CONDITIONS PRECEDENT ARE SATISFIED 
Exhaustion applies: 
(1) when a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency 
alone; (2) when the agency’s authority establishes clearly defined 
machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of 
complaints by aggrieved parties; and (3) when the relief 
sought . . . can be obtained by resort to an exclusive or adequate 
administrative remedy.7  
Said another way, these conditions precedent excuse the failure to exhaust 
when an agency lacks jurisdiction over the claim, lacks clear review 
procedures, or cannot provide any requested relief. And, if any of these 
conditions precedent is absent, the agency cannot issue a final, appealable 
order. As explained below, final, appealable orders have additional 
requirements, and there is no obligation to exhaust unless the agency 
issues a final, appealable order.8 
                                                      
3. Id. at 73–74, 677 P.2d at 118. 
4. See id. at 73, 677 P.2d at 117–18. 
5. See id. at 74, 677 P.2d at 118. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 73, 677 P.2d at 117–18 (internal citations omitted). 
8. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 635, 733 P.2d 182, 190–
91 (1987). 
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A. Exhaustion Is Not Required If the Agency Lacks Jurisdiction9 
No exhaustion requirement arises unless an agency has jurisdiction 
over a claim.10 For example, in State v. Tacoma-Pierce County Multiple 
Listing Service,11 the trial court dismissed antitrust actions filed by the 
Attorney General under the Washington Consumer Protection Act 
(CPA)12 for, among other things, failure to pursue an administrative 
remedy with either the Department of Licensing or the Real Estate 
Commission.13 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed and found the 
exhaustion doctrine did not apply because neither the Department nor the 
Commission was authorized to review CPA violations.14 Thus, the 
plaintiff could not be faulted for failing to exhaust, because exhaustion 
did not apply.15 
B.  Exhaustion Is Not Required If the Agency Lacks Clear Review 
Procedures16 
Only clearly defined exhaustion requirements are binding.17 A good 
example of this is found in Smoke v. City of Seattle.18 There, the plaintiff 
property owners challenged the denial of a building use permit.19 The 
applicable municipal code stated that the denial of the particular permit 
type—a “Type 1” master use permit (MUP)—was nonappealable.20 Still, 
the City argued the plaintiffs should have obtained a building site code 
interpretation, which would have been appealable.21 Although the 
plaintiffs could have obtained the interpretation, the Supreme Court of 
                                                      
9. This discussion overlaps with the adequate remedy discussion in section I.C.  
10. S. Hollywood, 101 Wash. 2d at 73, 677 P.2d at 117–18. 
11. 95 Wash. 2d 280, 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86 (2016). 
13. Tacoma-Pierce, 95 Wash. 2d at 282–83, 622 P.2d at 1191–92. 
14. Id. at 284, 622 P.2d at 1192. 
15. Id.; see also Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 868, 947 
P.2d 1208, 1212 (1997) (excusing plaintiff’s failure to exhaust remedies with Growth Management 
Hearings Board because the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the city council determination at 
issue). 
16. This discussion overlaps with the final, appealable order discussion in section I.D.2. 
17. Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 224, 937 P.2d 186, 190 (1997). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 219, 937 P.2d at 189. 
20. Id. at 217–18, 223, 937 P.2d at 187, 190. 
21. Id. at 223, 937 P.2d at 190. 
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Washington rejected the City’s argument they were required to do so.22 
The Court reasoned that such a requirement was not clearly defined: 
[T]he ordinance itself expressly states that Type I MUP decisions 
are nonappealable. See [Seattle Municipal Code] 23.76.004(B). 
No provision of the code suggests or requires that an applicant 
obtain an interpretation as an administrative remedy for a decision 
denying a Type I MUP application. The ordinance itself indicates 
that once the permitting decision has been made there are no other 
administrative remedies available.23 
In sum, the City could not hold the plaintiffs to an optional appeal 
procedure that was not described as mandatory in the code.24 
C.  Exhaustion Is Not Required If the Agency Cannot Provide an 
Adequate Remedy 
Plaintiffs must seek administrative review only if the agency can 
provide an adequate remedy.25 This may be the most significant inquiry 
for courts.26 The bar for an adequate remedy is quite low; incomplete relief 
may be an adequate remedy.27 The test for an adequate remedy is whether 
the agency is “empowered to entertain the type of claim and enforce its 
decision.”28 
Despite the low bar, the perceived inadequacy of a remedy is 
insufficient to escape the exhaustion requirement. Plaintiffs must pursue 
remedies thought to be unavailing because the lack of an adequate remedy 
cannot be speculative.29 For example, in Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. 
                                                      
22. Id. at 227, 937 P.2d at 192. 
23. Id. 
24. Id.  
25. See Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 642, 310 P.3d 804, 808 
(2013). 
26. See id. (“The primary question in exhaustion cases, however, is whether the relief sought can 
be obtained through an available administrative remedy.”). 
27. See, e.g., Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 837 P.2d 
1007, 1016 (1992) (concluding that adequate remedy existed where the agency could grant only 
declaratory relief even though the appellants sought both declaratory and injunctive relief). 
28. Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. 620, 626, 919 P.2d 93, 97 (1996). Consequently, 
there is substantial overlap between an agency’s lack of jurisdiction and its inability to provide relief. 
See id.; Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 868, 947 P.2d 1208, 
1212. 
29. See, e.g., Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. App. 216, 219, 752 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1988) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s claim of inadequacy where plaintiff could have objected to agency’s claim 
processing procedures but did not). 
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Washington Forest Practices Board,30 a group of environmentalists sued 
several state agencies for their failure to promulgate regulations that 
protected forests.31 The agencies alleged that the environmentalists failed 
to exhaust their administrative remedy of petitioning for rule making.32 
The environmentalists argued that this was unnecessary due to the 
agencies’ historic reluctance to address conservation issues.33 The 
Supreme Court of Washington agreed with the agencies, reasoning that it 
would not assume the agencies would ignore environmental issues.34 
Thus, an adequate remedy existed, and exhaustion was required.35 
D.  There Is No Obligation to Exhaust Without a Final, Appealable 
Order 
Finally, “[n]o exhaustion requirement arises without the issuance of a 
final, appealable order.”36 The term “final, appealable order” is redundant: 
an order is not appealable unless it is final, and vice versa.37 A final, 
appealable order will be found where the order (1) clearly asserts a legal 
relationship and (2) makes clear it is the final determination of rights.38 
Doubts as to finality are resolved against the agency and in favor of the 
plaintiff.39 
1.  Final, Appealable Orders Can Be Informal 
Final orders can be informal letters.40 In Bock v. State,41 the plaintiff 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the State Board of Pilotage 
Commissioners to issue him a pilot’s license.42 The plaintiff failed his 
license exam and appealed the result, which was affirmed by a review 
                                                      
30. 149 Wash. 2d 67, 66 P.3d 614 (2003). 
31. Id. at 69, 66 P.3d at 614. 
32. Id. at 71–72, 66 P.3d at 616. 
33. Id. at 78, 66 P.3d at 619. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
36. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 634, 733 P.2d 182, 190 
(1987). 
37. See Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 222–24, 937 P.2d 186, 189–90 (1997). 
38. Valley View, 107 Wash. 2d at 634, 733 P.2d at 190. 
39. Id. 
40. See, e.g., Bock v. State, 91 Wash. 2d 94, 99–100, 586 P.2d 1173, 1176 (1978) (finding that 
agency’s letter to plaintiff constituted final order because the letter denied a right and fixed a legal 
relationship). 
41. 91 Wash. 2d 94, 586 P.2d 1173 (1978). 
42. Id. at 95, 586 P.2d at 1174. 
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panel.43 The Board then informed the plaintiff by letter that it would take 
no further action on his case.44 In response, the plaintiff sued, rather than 
participating in the Board’s administrative appeal procedures.45 
The trial court dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to exhaust 
available remedies, and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed.46 The 
Court acknowledged that the letter was informal, but ultimately deemed 
it a final action because it denied a right and clearly communicated the 
end of administrative review.47 The Court stated that a more formal denial 
would be “preferable” but reasoned that the informality did not harm the 
plaintiff where he had actual notice of the Board denying his application.48 
2. Final, Appealable Orders Require Clear Appeal Procedures and 
Consistent Agency Action 
The lack of clear administrative decision-making procedures prevents 
a finding of a final order.49 In Valley View Industrial Park v. City of 
Redmond,50 the plaintiff submitted several building permit applications to 
the City of Redmond.51 After repeatedly requesting additional information 
from the plaintiff, the City downzoned the plaintiff’s land and rejected by 
letter the plaintiff’s request to modify the rezone.52 The following year, 
the City informed the plaintiff it deemed the building permit applications 
abandoned and lapsed, but city officials later assured the plaintiff it could 
proceed under the permits.53 The city council then denied another of the 
plaintiff’s applications to rezone the property.54 After the City refused to 
                                                      
43. Id. at 95–96, 586 P.2d at 1174. 
44. Id. at 96, 586 P.2d at 1175. 
45. Id. at 97–98, 586 P.2d at 1175.  
46. Id. at 97, 100, 586 P.2d at 1175, 1177. 
47. Id. at 99, 586 P.2d at 1176. 
48. Id.; see also Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 222–23, 937 P.2d 186, 190 (1997) 
(finding an informal letter from a city attorney was a final, appealable order, even though the letter 
stated it was not an appealable legal determination, because the agency explicitly denied an 
application); Harrington v. Spokane Cty., 128 Wash. App. 202, 214, 114 P.3d 1233, 1240 (2005) 
(finding the grant of a permit constituted a final order because it fixed a legal relationship, and related 
interim communications were not final determinations of rights). 
49. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 634, 733 P.2d 182, 190 
(1987). 
50. 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987). 
51. Id. at 628, 733 P.2d at 187. 
52. Id. at 628–29, 733 P.2d at 187. 
53. Id. at 629, 733 P.2d at 187–88. 
54. Id. 
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allow the plaintiff to proceed with a modified proposal, the plaintiff 
appealed that denial to superior court.55 
On review, the Court found the letter informing the plaintiff of the 
lapsed building permits was not a final order because it did not fix a clear 
end to the administrative process.56 This was so for two reasons. First, the 
City lacked a clear administrative decision-making process regarding 
building permit lapses.57 Second, the officials assured the plaintiff its 
rights had vested after the City sent the letter to the contrary.58 The 
“unclear and inconsistent nature of the permit lapse process” prevented a 
finding that the letter was a final order, so no exhaustion requirement 
arose.59 
3.  Final, Appealable Orders Must Be Issued in Compliance with 
Code Requirements 
In addition, an agency’s failure to comply with relevant code provisions 
may render its decision insufficient to constitute a final order.60 This was 
the case in WCHS, Inc. v. City of Lynnwood.61 There, plaintiff WCHS was 
an operator of opiate substitution treatment centers.62 The city planning 
manager informed WCHS that Lynwood zoning laws permitted 
construction of a new treatment center at a particular site.63 Consequently, 
WCHS entered into a lease for that site and filed applications for a 
building permit and business license.64 That same day, the city council 
held an emergency meeting regarding opiate substitution treatment 
centers and, four days later, changed the zoning laws so the proposed site 
would be illegal.65 The City denied both WCHS’s building permit and 
business license in separate letters that did not inform WCHS of its right 
                                                      
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 634–35, 733 P.2d at 190–91. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 635, 733 P.2d at 190–91. 
60. See, e.g., WCHS, Inc. v. City of Lynnwood, 120 Wash. App. 668, 679–80, 86 P.3d 1169, 1174–
75 (2004). 
61. 120 Wash. App. 668, 86 P.3d 1169 (2004). 
62. Id. at 671, 86 P.3d at 1170. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 672, 86 P.3d at 1171. 
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to a review hearing.66 WCHS then sued for declaratory judgment and a 
writ of mandamus.67 
In finding for WCHS, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the 
City’s argument that the denial letters were final orders that should have 
been appealed administratively.68 The court reasoned that neither letter 
complied with the city code provisions governing who should receive 
notice of decisions and requiring disclosure of the right to appeal.69 Given 
this non-compliance, the letters could not give rise to exhaustion.70 
4. Final, Appealable Orders May Need Facial Evidence of Both 
Finality and a Direct Response to the Filed Request 
A denial letter may not be a final, appealable order unless it has 
language demonstrating its finality and its direct response to the filed 
request.71 For example, the WCHS court noted that the denial letters did 
not use words like “decision,” “final,” or “appealable.”72 Instead, one 
letter stated that the plaintiff’s application was “‘incomplete’ but would 
remain open for 180 days.”73 This inconsistent and unclear language left 
doubt as to the decisions’ finality and thus the letters were not clearly 
understandable as final determinations of rights.74 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Washington recently held that final 
orders must directly respond to the filed request.75 In Cost Management 
Services, Inc. v. City of Lakewood (CMS),76 a corporation believed it 
mistakenly paid a city tax during 2004 and September 2008, so it stopped 
paying the tax and filed a refund claim.77 The City responded by issuing 
an order to pay past-due taxes from October 2008 forward.78 Although the 
City’s administrative procedures could have provided relief, the plaintiff 
could not access those procedures because the City failed to respond 
                                                      
66. Id. at 673, 86 P.3d at 1171. 
67. Id. at 673–74, 86 P.3d at 1171. 
68. Id. at 679–80, 86 P.3d at 1174–75. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 680, 86 P.3d at 1175. 
71. See id. at 679–80, 86 P.3d at 1175. 
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 679, 86 P.3d at 1174. 
74. Id. at 680, 86 P.3d at 1175. 
75. See Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 645, 310 P.3d 804, 810 
(2013). 
76. 178 Wash. 2d 63, 310 P.3d 804 (2013). 
77. Id. at 638, 310 P.3d at 806. 
78. Id.  
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directly to its application.79 The CMS Court held that the failure to respond 
thus obviated the administrative exhaustion requirement.80 
II.  EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION APPLY WHEN FAIRNESS 
AND PRACTICALITY OUTWEIGH THE SUBSTANTIAL 
POLICY INTERESTS SUPPORTING EXHAUSTION 
Even where all conditions precedent exist and the exhaustion 
requirement attaches, courts will excuse the failure to exhaust if fairness 
and practicality concerns outweigh the policies supporting exhaustion.81 
These policy interests loom large when courts evaluate whether to excuse 
exhaustion.82 Accordingly, exceptions to exhaustion are rare. The only 
circumstances where courts have excused the failure to exhaust have been 
when exhaustion was futile,83 the plaintiff’s claim involved only legal 
issues,84 and when due process demanded it.85 
A.  Futility Excuses the Failure to Exhaust When the Requested Relief 
Cannot Be Granted as a Matter of Law 
Exhaustion of remedies will be excused as futile when “the available 
remedies are inadequate, or if they are vain and useless.”86 Futility is 
decided as a matter of law.87 The burden borne by the party asserting 
futility has not been precisely defined. In Estate of Friedman v. Pierce 
County,88 the Supreme Court of Washington explained that the burden is 
lower than uncontroverted evidence, which the Court called “exceedingly 
high” and “virtually impossible” to meet.89 However, the Friedman Court 
did not explore the issue further.90 
                                                      
79. Id. at 643, 310 P.3d at 809. 
80. Id. at 645, 310 P.3d at 810. 
81. See S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n for Pres. of Neighborhood Safety & Env’t v. King Cty., 
101 Wash. 2d 68, 73–74, 677 P.2d 114, 118 (1984).  
82. Id. at 74, 677 P.2d at 118. 
83. See Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985).  
84. See Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. 620, 919 P.2d 93 (1996). 
85. See Wash. Teamsters Welfare Trust Fund v. DePiano, 26 Wash. App. 52, 612 P.2d 805 (1980). 
86. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 458, 693 P.2d 1369, 1379 (1985) (quoting 4 ROBERT 
M. ANDERSON, ZONING § 26.10 (2d ed. 1977)). This overlaps with the adequate remedy discussion 
in section I.C.  
87. Beard v. King Cty., 76 Wash. App. 863, 871, 889 P.2d 501, 506 (1995). 
88. 112 Wash. 2d 68, 768 P.2d 462 (1989). 
89. Id. at 77, 768 P.2d at 466. 
90. See id.  
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Futility excuses exhaustion only in “rare factual situations.”91 Thus far, 
Washington courts have approved the futility defense in only two 
situations: when the requested relief is prohibited by legislation or a 
statewide policy,92 and when evidence supports an inference of bias on the 
part of appeal decision-makers.93 
The most well-known Washington futility case is Orion Corporation 
v. State.94 There, a developer brought an inverse condemnation action 
against the State, alleging that state and county shoreline management 
policies rendered its property effectively useless.95 The record 
demonstrated that the State made a “conscious policy choice” to preserve 
the area owned by the developer and that the State planned to create an 
estuarine sanctuary that required the developer’s property.96 Because 
these decisions forced the developer to keep the land in its natural state, 
the Supreme Court of Washington found that applying for a conditional 
use permit would be futile.97 The Court acknowledged that the futility 
exception was rare, but reasoned that it applied on these facts because the 
“willingness to consider an application is irrelevant if there is no hope of 
success if one is submitted.”98 The Court has since characterized the 
holding in Orion as applying to cases where “legislation or statewide 
policy” prevents relief.99 
In reaching its conclusion, the Orion Court stated that “futility 
addresses more than a direct showing of bias or prejudice on the part of 
discretionary decision makers.”100 This is consistent with the general rule 
that a plaintiff’s subjective belief is insufficient to establish futility.101 For 
                                                      
91. Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. App. 216, 219, 752 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1988); see also 
Spokoiny v. Wash. St. Youth Soccer Ass’n, 128 Wash. App. 794, 802, 117 P.3d 1141, 1145–46 (2005) 
(finding no futility where plaintiff was concerned the administrative process would not provide timely 
relief); KSLW by Wells v. City of Renton, 47 Wash. App. 587, 591–92, 736 P.2d 664, 667–68 (1986) 
(finding no futility where plaintiff abandoned its administrative appeal purportedly after the City 
agreed a court should resolve the dispute). 
92. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 457–60, 693 P.2d 1369, 1379–80 (1985). 
93. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 127, 133, 769 P.2d 298, 301 
(1989). 
94. 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985). 
95. Id. at 443, 456, 693 P.2d at 1371, 1378. 
96. Id. at 457, 693 P.2d at 1378.  
97. Id. at 460, 693 P.2d at 1380. 
98. Id. at 457–58, 693 P.2d at 1379. 
99. Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d 761, 778, 837 P.2d 1007, 1016 
(1992). 
100. 103 Wash. 2d at 458, 693 P.2d at 1379. 
101. See Buechler v. Wenatchee Valley Coll., 174 Wash. App. 141, 154, 298 P.3d 110, 117 (2013); 
Beard v. King Cty., 76 Wash. App. 863, 871, 889 P.2d 501, 505 (1995). 
20_KH_Murphy_Zanzig - Copy-edited.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/16  10:07 AM 
228 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:217 
 
example, in Beard v. King County,102 a police officer under investigation 
for rape did not apply for a promotion after he was told he would not be 
considered for the job by the sheriff who personally made promotion 
decisions.103 After being cleared of the rape charge, the officer sued for 
unfair employment practices and alleged the sheriff’s statement rendered 
any administrative appeal futile.104 The Washington Court of Appeals 
found futility did not apply because the sheriff could have been forced to 
change his off-the-record position in light of the formal selection process 
if the plaintiff was the most qualified candidate.105 Beard suggests futility 
will not be found when there is the slightest chance the administrative 
process could provide relief. 
However, in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.,106 
the Supreme Court of Washington found futility may apply when the facts 
support an inference of the decision-makers’ bias.107 There, the plaintiff 
was fired from the defendant hospital after an investigation into whether 
he sexually assaulted a patient.108 The plaintiff sued the hospital for 
wrongful termination without first pursuing the contractually required 
four-step grievance procedure.109 The plaintiff argued that the procedure 
would be futile because it required him to appeal to the hospital 
administrator, whose assistant was instrumental in the underlying 
investigation.110 Finding in the plaintiff’s favor, the Court reasoned that 
the evidence showed people from each step of the appeal procedure made 
the initial decision to fire him.111 The Court thus found that the plaintiff 
raised a genuine issue of bias.112 
Although this decision may appear contrary to the statement in Orion 
and the rule against speculative futility, it is important to note the precise 
issue before the Baldwin Court. The question was whether to affirm the 
denial of the hospital’s motion for a directed verdict, meaning the Court 
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and could 
reverse the denial “only if no evidence or reasonable inference exist[ed] 
                                                      
102. 76 Wash. App. 863, 889 P.2d 501 (1995). 
103. Id. at 864–65, 869, 889 P.2d at 502–03. 
104. Id. at 869–70, 889 P.2d at 504–05. 
105. Id. at 871, 889 P.2d at 505–06. 
106. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). 
107. Id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301. 
108. Id. at 129–30, 769 P.2d at 299–300. 
109. Id. at 130, 769 P.2d at 300. 
110. Id. at 132–33, 769 P.2d at 300–01. 
111. Id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301. 
112. Id.  
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which would be sufficient to sustain a verdict for” the hospital.113 In other 
words, the Court did not find that futility was conclusively established; 
rather, it found that there was sufficient evidence of futility to survive a 
motion for directed verdict.114 Importantly, the Baldwin Court also stated 
that the “principle that a subjective belief of futility is sufficient to invoke 
the exception would conflict with the strong bias toward requiring 
exhaustion in Washington.”115 
Ultimately, futility remains an extraordinary remedy that courts are 
reluctant to grant.116 
B.  Failure to Exhaust May Be Excused When the Issue Is Legal, Not 
Factual 
“If a lawsuit presents only issues of law, the court may excuse 
exhaustion because the agency’s usual fact finding task is not implicated, 
and, in any event, the courts have ultimate authority to interpret 
statutes.”117 This exception often arises in the context of constitutional 
challenges.118 As-applied constitutional challenges require factual 
determinations, meaning that administrative exhaustion is appropriate.119 
By contrast, facial constitutional challenges are purely legal questions and 
typically fall outside an agency’s expertise and authority, meaning 
exhaustion is generally not required.120 For example, a facial 
constitutional challenge may appear as a challenge to an agency’s 
jurisdiction.121 However, if the “agency is charged with interpreting and 
                                                      
113. Id. at 132, 769 P.2d at 300–01. 
114. See id. at 133, 769 P.2d at 301.  
115. Id.  
116. See, e.g., Buechler v. Wenatchee Valley Coll., 174 Wash. App. 141, 154, 298 P.3d 110, 117 
(2013); Spokoiny v. Wash. St. Youth Soccer Ass’n, 128 Wash. App. 794, 802, 117 P.3d 1141, 1145–
46 (2005); Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. App. 216, 219, 752 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1988); 
KSLW by Wells v. City of Renton, 47 Wash. App. 587, 592–93, 736 P.2d 664, 667–68 (1986). But 
see Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 46 Wash. App. 793, 798, 732 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1987) (concluding that 
fairness and practicality outweighed policies supporting exhaustion, in part because “the only avenue 
of appeal would have been to the city council, a body which had itself previously imposed these fees 
directly upon” the plaintiff). 
117. Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. 620, 628–29, 919 P.2d 93, 98 (1996). 
118. See, e.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 337, 787 P.2d 907, 916 (1990) 
(discussing plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to the ordinance and its relationship to the exhaustion 
requirement). 
119. See id. 
120. See id.; Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. at 628–29, 919 P.2d at 98–99; Schreiber v. Riemcke, 11 Wash. 
App. 873, 875, 526 P.2d 904, 906 (1974). 
121. See, e.g., Spokane Cty. v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 644, 652, 966 P.2d 305, 309 (1998). 
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applying a particular statute, that agency expertise usually assists the court 
in performing the judicial function.”122 Thus, even facial constitutional 
challenges may require exhaustion. 
C.  Procedural Due Process Violations Excuse the Failure to Exhaust 
Finally, it can be argued that the exhaustion requirement violates due 
process, although this argument should be a last resort.123 Due process 
arguments may excuse exhaustion if a plaintiff was wrongfully denied 
meaningful access to appeal procedures.124 In Washington Teamsters 
Welfare Trust Fund v. DePiano,125 insurance trusts sued a patient for 
medical claims that the trusts alleged they mistakenly paid.126 The patient 
countersued for wrongful denial of claims.127 The trusts alleged the 
patient’s claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust contractual 
remedies before filing his court action.128 The Washington Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that “[e]xhaustion is excused 
not only when resort to such procedures would be futile, but also when a 
claimant has been wrongfully denied meaningful access to those 
procedures and where the available remedy is inadequate.”129 The court 
found the patient lacked meaningful access to the procedures because he 
was “denied benefits by both trusts and had been called into court by both 
trusts shortly after those denials.”130 Thus, the court did not punish the 
patient for pursuing a counterclaim rather than administrative remedies.131 
Due process will also excuse exhaustion when the plaintiff received no 
notice of the agency’s determination. For example, in Gardner v. Pierce 
County Board of Commissioners,132 a landowner appealed a commission’s 
                                                      
122. Zewdu, 82 Wash. App. at 629, 919 P.2d at 98; accord Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 1001 
Chartered By Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Wash. Surveying & Rating Bureau, Wash. 
Bureau, 87 Wash. 2d 887, 907 n.7, 558 P.2d 215, 227 n.7 (1976). 
123. Cf. Rosen v. City of Tacoma, 24 Wash. App. 735, 741, 603 P.2d 846, 850 (1979) (holding that 
arbitrary and capricious municipal agency actions are not a basis for relief without exhaustion). 
124. See, e.g., Wash. Teamsters Welfare Trust Fund v. DePiano, 26 Wash. App. 52, 57, 612 P.2d 
805, 808 (1980). 
125. 26 Wash. App. 52, 612 P.2d 805 (1980). 
126. Id. at 53, 623 P.2d at 806. 
127. Id. at 54, 623 P.2d at 806. 
128. See id. 
129. Id. at 57, 623 P.2d at 808. 
130. Id. at 58, 623 P.2d at 808. 
131. See id.  
132. 27 Wash. App. 241, 617 P.2d 743 (1980). 
20_KH_Murphy_Zanzig - Copy-edited.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/16  10:07 AM 
2016] EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 231 
 
approval of a preliminary plat adjacent to his home.133 The County 
conceded that it did not provide notice of its determination and that the 
plaintiff was unaware of the determination until he attended a subsequent 
hearing.134 The Washington Court of Appeals held that the landowner did 
not fail to exhaust, because “[w]here one has not enjoyed a fair 
opportunity to exhaust the administrative process . . . exhaustion of 
administrative remedies will not be required.”135 
III.  WASHINGTON LAW CURRENTLY INVOLVES ELEMENTS 
THAT OVERLAP AMONG THE PRECONDITIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION 
In sum, courts require exhaustion when four conditions precedent are 
met: (1) the agency has jurisdiction over the claim; (2) the agency has 
clear review procedures; (3) the agency can provide an adequate remedy; 
and (4) the agency issues a final, appealable order. If these conditions 
precedent are satisfied, the exhaustion requirement attaches to a claim. 
Once the exhaustion requirement attaches, courts may excuse a failure to 
exhaust if matters of fairness and practicality outweigh the policy interests 
supporting exhaustion. 
Many of these concepts overlap, which contributes to the murky 
discussion of administrative exhaustion currently found in Washington 
case law. For example, although we frame the adequate remedy 
requirement as a condition precedent, the agency’s ability to provide an 
adequate remedy also permeates the exception analysis. Whether an 
agency can provide an adequate remedy is also relevant to jurisdiction, 
futility, and the ability to issue a final, appealable order. The uniting 
principle is the agency’s ability to provide relief, a crucial piece of the 
exhaustion analysis. 
                                                      
133. Id. at 242, 617 P.2d at 744. 
134. Id. at 243, 617 P.2d at 745. 
135. Id. at 243–44, 617 P.2d at 745. We note that Gardner precedes the enactment of the Land Use 
Petition Act (LUPA), WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70C (1996). “LUPA does not require that a party 
receive individualized notice of a land use decision in order to be subject to the time limits for filing 
a LUPA petition.” Samuel’s Furniture, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 147 Wash. 2d 440, 462, 54 P.3d 
1194, 1205 (2002). 
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IV.  EQUITABLE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WHILE A PLAINTIFF PURSUES ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES WOULD PROTECT VALID CLAIMS AND 
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESSES 
Given the exhaustion doctrine’s lack of clarity, it can be difficult for 
plaintiffs—and their attorneys—to know whether the exhaustion 
requirement applies. Moreover, if a plaintiff chooses to pursue 
administrative remedies, the process can be time-consuming.136 While the 
plaintiff maneuvers the administrative process, the clock is running on his 
or her claim.137 This can result in an otherwise valid claim being barred 
from judicial review, a harsh result that does not truly serve the rationales 
underlying the exhaustion doctrine. 
Accordingly, this article proposes that Washington courts expand the 
current equitable tolling doctrine and implement an approach that 
California and other states have used to protect such claims: tolling the 
statute of limitations while a plaintiff pursues administrative remedies. 
Under Washington law, a court “may toll the statute of limitations 
when justice requires such tolling but it must use the doctrine 
sparingly.”138 As set forth in Douchette v. Bethel School District No. 
403,139 equitable tolling is available only where there is (1) an exercise of 
diligence by the plaintiff and (2) bad faith, deception, or false assurances 
by the defendant.140 Thus, in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the 
part of the defendant, a plaintiff who diligently pursues administrative 
remedies cannot have the statute of limitations tolled on his or her claim. 
This effectively punishes a plaintiff who takes timely action but must 
undergo the administrative process before seeking judicial relief. 
                                                      
136. See, e.g., Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 640, 310 P.3d 804, 
807 (2013) (plaintiff waited six months for agency action that was ultimately unresponsive); Smoke 
v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 218, 937 P.2d 186, 187 (1997) (plaintiff engaged in more than 
a year of dispute with City about permit status); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 
Wash. 2d 621, 629, 733 P.2d 182, 187–88 (1987) (plaintiff negotiated with City for three months after 
zoning request denial). 
137. Equitable tolling would not be necessary if completing the administrative process preserved 
the claim as it existed at the time of filing the administrative appeal. However, we have not found a 
case that has so held. Alternatively, the legislature could address this issue by passing a statute that 
provides: “Statutes of limitations will be tolled during an administrative appeal that is exhausted.” 
138. Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 153 Wash. App. 366, 378, 223 P.3d 1172, 1177–78 
(2009). 
139. 117 Wash. 2d 805, 818 P.2d 1362 (1991). 
140. Id. at 812, 818 P.2d at 1365. 
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California courts address this issue by applying equitable tolling 
“[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies, and reasonably and 
in good faith, pursues one.”141 Under California law, where the exhaustion 
requirement applies, “equitable tolling is automatic.”142 As the California 
Supreme Court explains, tolling has many benefits: 
Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress 
in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting 
decisions on the same issue.” By alleviating the fear of claim 
forfeiture, it affords grievants the opportunity to pursue informal 
remedies, a process we have repeatedly encouraged. The tolling 
doctrine does so without compromising defendants’ significant 
“interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in 
order that they may gather and preserve evidence” because that 
notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that 
gives rise to tolling. Lastly, tolling benefits the court system by 
reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing 
requirement, in many instances rendering later court proceedings 
either easier and cheaper to resolve or wholly unnecessary.143 
Other courts around the country have also recognized that equitable 
tolling constitutes prudent public policy in similar contexts.144 
A.  Equitable Tolling Is Consistent with the Policies Supporting 
Exhaustion 
Along with these advantages, we note that equitable tolling would be 
consistent with the policies underlying exhaustion that have been 
articulated by Washington courts. These policies include preserving the 
administrative process and agency autonomy; allowing the agency to 
develop the factual record and exercise its expertise; 
                                                      
141. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Cal. 2008) (quoting 
Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81, 84 (1974)). 
142. McDonald, 194 P.2d at 1032.  
143. Id. at 1032 (internal citations omitted). 
144. See, e.g., Am. Marine Corp. v. Sholin, 295 P.3d 924, 927 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Gudenau & 
Co. v. Sweeney Ins., Inc., 736 P.2d 763, 768 (Alaska 1987)) (“The equitable tolling doctrine is 
applicable ‘when a plaintiff has multiple legal remedies available’ so that ‘[c]ourts will not force a 
plaintiff to simultaneously pursue two separate and duplicative remedies.’”); Weidow v. Uninsured 
Emp’rs’ Fund, 2010 MT 292, ¶ 28, 359 Mont. 77, 246 P.3d 704 (noting that equitable tolling should 
be applied sparingly, but “reject[ing] any one-size-fits-all approach that would serve only to 
undermine the purpose of the equitable tolling doctrine and could deprive a plaintiff of his or her 
rights when such an approach would serve no policy purpose”); Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Freudenthal, 
861 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1993) (“The doctrine acts to toll the statute of limitations for the one 
remedy while the party is pursuing the other.”). 
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promoting efficiency; and discouraging individuals from ignoring agency 
procedure by resorting to the courts.145 Tolling the statute of limitations 
addresses these concerns by encouraging claimants to pursue 
administrative remedies without fear of losing access to judicial review. 
Moreover, the application of equitable tolling would create fair 
outcomes for plaintiffs who diligently pursue their claims: “[i]n deciding 
whether to grant an equitable remedy, courts often ‘balance the equities’ 
between the parties, taking into consideration the relief sought by the 
plaintiff and the hardship imposed on the defendant.”146 Tolling the statute 
of limitations strikes an appropriate balance between awarding a plaintiff 
complete relief and the relatively minor hardship a defendant suffers from 
an extended limitations period.147 CMS provides a clear example of this. 
There, the plaintiff became aware of its claim in November 2008 but did 
not file suit until June 2009 because it was waiting for the City to respond 
to its appeal for administrative relief.148 Ultimately, the City’s action was 
nonresponsive.149 The Supreme Court of Washinton held that the failure 
to respond obviated the administrative exhaustion requirement.150 
However, the three-year statute of limitations prevented the plaintiff from 
recovering any taxes paid before June 2006.151 Had the statute of 
limitations been tolled, the plaintiff’s claim would include seven months 
more of back taxes. Equitable tolling in this and similar circumstances 
would eliminate “the potential for abuse which legal process may serve in 
the hands of public officials, bankrolled with public funds, who seek to 
achieve by delay and the necessity for costly court suits or administrative 
hearings what they cannot achieve on the merits[.]”152 
With these considerations in mind, we propose that Washington courts 
apply equitable tolling where the plaintiff exercises diligence in pursuing 
                                                      
145. See S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n for Pres. of Neighborhood Safety & Env’t v. King Cty., 
101 Wash. 2d 68, 73–74, 677 P.2d 114, 117 (1984).  
146. Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812, 818 P.2d 1362, 1365 (1991) 
(citing 27 AM. JUR. 2d § 107 (1966)). 
147. We further address this hardship below in our discussion of the rationales behind statutes of 
limitation. See infra section IV.B. 
148. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 639–40, 310 P.3d 804, 807–
08 (2013). 
149. Id. at 639, 310 P.3d at 807. 
150. Id. at 645, 310 P.3d at 810. 
151. See id. 
152. City of Seattle v. Blume, 134 Wash. 2d 243, 259, 947 P.2d 223, 230 (1997) (quoting King v. 
City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 252–53, 525 P.2d 228, 236 (1974)). 
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administrative remedies, without requiring a showing of bad faith or 
deception on the administrative body’s behalf.153 
B.  Equitable Tolling Is Consistent with the Policies Supporting 
Statutes of Limitation 
We acknowledge that, unlike California, Washington requires bad faith 
as a predicate for equitable tolling.154 It should be noted that bad faith as 
a requirement—rather than simply a relevant factor—is fairly new and 
unexplored. The Douchette Court established it as such in 1991.155 But, 
the case Douchette relies upon, Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel,156 
recognized bad faith as only one possible ground—not a prerequisite—
for granting equitable relief.157 Historically, Washington courts evaluating 
equitable remedies align with the Copeland Court’s treatment of bad 
faith.158 Without further explanation or citation, the Douchette Court 
elevated its importance, stating, “[i]n the absence of bad faith on the part 
of the defendant and reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff, 
equity cannot be invoked.”159 The basis for requiring this element is thus 
unclear. 
Nonetheless, we recognize that the bad faith element has been 
embraced by Washington courts.160 Still, given the positive effects of our 
                                                      
153. While we argue that bad faith should not be required, we note that the failure to equitably toll 
the statute of limitations has the potential to incentivize bad faith on the part of the administrative 
body. For example, if the statute of limitations is running while the agency processes a claim, the 
agency may be incentivized to delay so as to limit liability.  
154. Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812, 818 P.2d 1362, 1365 (1991). 
155. See id. at 811–12, 818 P.2d at 1364–65. 
156. 673 P.2d 490 (Nev. 1983). 
157. Id. at 826. 
158. See, e.g., Dodge v. Scripps, 179 Wash. 308, 317, 37 P.2d 896, 900 (1934) (characterizing bad 
faith as a “foundation for equitable relief,” but not establishing it as a requirement); Niemi v. Brewster, 
154 Wash. 181, 186–87, 281 P. 488, 489–90 (1929) (discussing bad faith as one possible ground for 
rejecting plaintiff’s claim, along with undue prejudice to defendant); Morris v. Hillman Inv. Co., 99 
Wash. 276, 283, 169 P. 837 (1918) (discussing various bases for applying equitable estoppel, one of 
which was bad faith); Young v. Jones, 72 Wash. 277, 282–83, 130 P. 90, 92–93 (1913) (same). It is 
also well-established that a party’s own bad faith precludes a grant of equitable relief in his or her 
favor. Retail Clerks Health & Welfare Trust Funds v. Shopland Supermarket, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 939, 
949, 640 P.2d 1051, 1057 (1982) (“He who seeks equity must do equity . . . he who comes into equity 
must come with clean hands.”). But it does not follow from this principle that the opposing party’s 
bad faith should be required. 
159. Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 812, 818 P.2d at 1365. 
160. See, e.g., Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash. 2d 193, 206, 955 P.2d 791, 796 (1998) (citing Douchette 
as basis for requiring bad faith); Danzer v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 104 Wash. App. 307, 318, 16 
P.3d 35, 40 (2000) (same); Prekeges v. King Cty., 98 Wash. App. 275, 283, 990 P.2d 406, 410 (1999) 
20_KH_Murphy_Zanzig - Copy-edited.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/16  10:07 AM 
236 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:217 
 
equitable tolling proposal, we urge the courts to carve out an exception to 
Douchette in the administrative exhaustion context. As argued above, we 
believe this would serve the interests underlying exhaustion and lead to 
better outcomes for Washington claimants. Moreover, it would be 
otherwise consistent with Washington law. 
For example, we acknowledge the principle that the “statute of 
limitations is ‘a legislative declaration of public policy which the courts 
can do no less than respect.’”161 Generally, Washington courts will not 
read into statutes of limitation an exception that has not been embodied 
therein.162 Thus, “[i]n Washington equitable tolling is appropriate when 
consistent with both the purpose of the statute providing the cause of 
action and the purpose of the statute of limitations.”163 Otherwise, 
equitable tolling would “essentially allow[] a judicial branch officer to 
override a legislative determination.”164 
In this circumstance, however, the application of equitable tolling 
would not invade the province of the legislature. “The policy behind 
statutes of limitation is ‘protection of the defendant, and the courts, from 
litigation of stale claims where plaintiffs have slept on their rights and 
evidence may have been lost or witnesses’ memories faded.’”165 But 
where a plaintiff diligently pursues administrative remedies, these 
concerns are not implicated. The Montana Supreme Court articulated this 
principle well, noting that “limitations periods are designed to ensure 
justice by preventing surprise, but no surprise exists when defendants are 
already on notice of the substantive claims being brought against them.”166 
By engaging in the system of administrative appeals, a plaintiff gives 
timely notice to a defendant and moves the claim forward, fulfilling the 
purposes of the statute of limitations. 
                                                      
(same); Finkelstein v. Sec. Props., Inc., 76 Wash. App. 733, 739–40, 888 P.2d 161, 166–67 (1995) 
(same). 
161. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 651, 310 P.3d 804, 813 
(2013) (quoting J.M. Arthur & Co. v. Burke, 83 Wash. 690, 693, 145 P. 974, 975 (1915)).  
162. Id. at 651, 310 P.3d at 813. 
163. Millay, 135 Wash. 2d at 206, 955 P.2d at 797 (citing Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 812, 818 
P.2d at 1365).  
164. Rekhter v. Dep’t of Social and Health Servs., 180 Wash. 2d 102, 150, 323 P. 3d 1036, 1059 
(Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing Leschner v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 27 Wash. 2d 911, 926, 185 
P.2d 113, 121–22 (1947)). 
165. Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 813, 818 P.2d at 1365 (citing Hosogai v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327 
(Ariz. 1985)). 
166. Stevens v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2010 MT 282, ¶ 33, 358 Mont. 474, 247 P.3d 244. 
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We find support for this assertion in Ames v. Department of Labor & 
Industries,167 a landmark Washington case on equitable tolling. There, the 
Supreme Court of Washington tolled the statute of limitations for a 
workman’s claim because the claimant was mentally incapacitated during 
the limitations period.168 The Court recognized that the legislature “has 
always been well advised of the uses and the purposes of equity,” which 
“relieve[s] under special circumstances from the harshness of strict legal 
rules.”169 On those facts, the Court concluded that a strict application of 
the statute of limitations would be contrary to public policy and legislative 
intent.170 We argue that our approach serves similar goals: equitable 
tolling would promote good public policy by preserving valid claims and 
incentivizing the pursuit of administrative remedies, and it would serve 
the legislative intent behind limitations periods by giving notice to 
defendants and avoiding stale claims. 
C.  The Supreme Court of Washington Has Recognized the Tension 
Between Exhaustion and Statutes of Limitation 
Although no Washington court has explicitly applied equitable tolling 
in the exhaustion context, the Supreme Court of Washington has invoked 
an equitable analysis to allow a claim that would have otherwise been 
barred by the statute of limitations.171 In Valley View, the plaintiff property 
developer failed to appeal the City’s denial of his permit applications 
within 30 days as provided by city code.172 The Court rejected the City’s 
argument that the statute of limitations barred relief, reasoning that the 
plaintiff believed in good faith, based on the City’s representations, that it 
had a vested right to develop its property.173 The plaintiff pursued 
administrative relief in reliance on the City’s assurances and sought 
judicial review once the City issued its final denial.174 Without expressly 
conducting an equitable tolling analysis, the Court found the plaintiff did 
not lose its right to obtain relief “simply because it took more than 30 days 
                                                      
167. 176 Wash. 509, 30 P.2d 239 (1934). 
168. Id. at 513–14. 
169. Id. at 513. 
170. Id.  
171. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 632, 733 P.2d 182, 189 
(1987). 
172. Id. at 629, 631, 733 P.2d at 189. 
173. Id. at 629, 632, 733 P.2d at 187–89. 
174. Id. at 632, 733 P.2d at 189. 
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to seek some accommodation from the City.”175 Valley View demonstrates 
the justice of applying equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances, as 
well as the Court’s willingness to do so. 
In CMS, the Court more explicitly addressed the relationship between 
the administrative process and statutes of limitation. CMS was a dispute 
over taxes the plaintiff alleged it mistakenly paid to the City of 
Lakewood.176 The plaintiff sought repayment of taxes paid outside of the 
three-year limitations period, but the trial court ruled that the statute of 
limitations barred recovery.177 The plaintiff then attempted to recover 
those taxes by seeking a writ of mandamus to force the City to respond to 
its corresponding refund claim.178 The Court disapproved of this tactic: 
CMS seeks mandamus for the express purpose of reaching back 
beyond the legal statute of limitations. We do not think the statute 
of limitations can be overcome by such a use of the administrative 
process. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that CMS 
cannot choose first to pursue recovery through the courts and then 
attempt to bypass the statute of limitations that necessarily applies 
as a result of that choice by seeking relief through the 
administrative process.179 
One might argue that this holding signals disapproval of the approach 
advocated here. We disagree. Importantly, the issue in CMS was not 
equitable tolling of a claim after a plaintiff diligently pursues 
administrative remedies. Instead, the question was whether the plaintiff 
could use the administrative process to circumvent the statute of 
limitations and revive stale claims after receiving an adverse ruling from 
the court. Thus, factually speaking, CMS is inapposite. Moreover, like our 
proposal, the CMS holding demonstrates respect for the timely and 
appropriate pursuit of claims.180 Unlike the writ of mandamus in that case, 
equitable tolling of a timely pursued claim is not a work-around. 
                                                      
175. Id. 
176. See Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wash. 2d 635, 638, 310 P.3d 804, 806 
(2013). 
177. Id. at 640, 310 P.3d at 807. 
178. Id.  
179. Id. at 652, 310 P.3d at 813. 
180. See id. at 651–52, 310 P.3d at 813 (“[The plaintiff] sought mandamus only after the trial court 
informed it that its recovery in superior court was constrained by the three year statute of limitations. 
In essence, CMS seeks to use the administrative process to revive a claim otherwise barred by the 
three year statute of limitations.”). 
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D.  Equitable Tolling Is Consistent with Existing Washington 
Precedent 
The issue of equitable tolling and administrative remedies also arose in 
Rekhter v. Department of Social and Health Services.181 In that case, the 
plaintiffs brought suit challenging determinations made by the 
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), but failed to do so 
within the 90 days required by statute.182 The trial court concluded that 
equitable tolling of the deadline was justified by the plaintiffs’ 
vulnerability and the nature of the administrative appeal process.183 Upon 
review by the Supreme Court of Washington, the majority did not reach 
this issue. However, the dissent criticized the trial judge for reaching a 
“conclusion [that] would completely eviscerate the statute of 
limitations . . . for each and every DSHS client.”184 
While this opinion is not binding, we find it helpful to explain how it 
is also consistent with our proposal. Unlike a plaintiff who timely and 
diligently exhausts administrative remedies, the plaintiffs in Rekhter sat 
on their claims far beyond the statutory time limit.185 The dissent reasoned 
that this ran afoul of the legislature’s intent to limit the state’s exposure to 
liability.186 What we propose would not implicate these concerns. The 
pursuit of administrative remedies notifies a defendant of a claim, and 
tolling still sets a fixed time period for liability, but does so without 
leaving the plaintiff at the mercy of the administrative process. 
Finally, we note that our proposal does not contradict the Supreme 
Court of Washington’s recently expressed “reluctan[ce] to apply 
exceptions to legislative time limits”187 or to extend equitable tolling 
standards “beyond the traditional standard.”188 Notably, these sentiments 
were both articulated in the personal restraint petition (PRP) context, 
which implicates specific policies that apply to collateral attacks of 
criminal convictions.189 The Court also recognized that RCW 10.73.100 
                                                      
181. 180 Wash. 2d 102, 323 P.3d 1036 (2014). 
182. Id. at 149, 323 P.3d at 1059 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 150–51, 323 P.3d at 1059–60 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 153, 323 P.3d at 1061 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
185. See id. at 109, 323 P.3d at 1039–40 (suit brought in 2007 challenging determinations made as 
early as April 2003). 
186. Id. at 149–50, 323 P.3d at 1059–60 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
187. In re Bonds, 165 Wash. 2d 135, 143, 196 P.3d 672, 677 (2008).  
188. In re Haghighi, 178 Wash. 2d 435, 447–48, 309 P.3d 459, 465–66 (2013). 
189. Those policies include undermining the finality of convictions, which would prevent a 
prisoner from obtaining federal habeas corpus relief. See Haghighi, 178 Wash. 2d at 448, 309 P.3d at 
465–66; Bonds, 165 Wash. 2d at 143, 196 P.3d at 677. 
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provides petitioners with multiple grounds for tolling the statute of 
limitations, such as newly discovered evidence, facial invalidity of the 
judgment and sentence, and double jeopardy violations.190 The Court 
distinguished this from other “normal” contexts, where “equitable tolling 
might be the only way in which a party is not deprived of his or her 
remedy.”191 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is one of those 
“normal” contexts in which equitable tolling may be the only device by 
which to preserve a valid claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion does not apply to every 
claim, but it can have severe results when it does. Plaintiffs should exhaust 
their administrative remedies when required because courts excuse the 
failure to exhaust only in exceedingly rare circumstances. Yet, when 
exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review, the attendant delay can 
result in the statute of limitations barring just relief, either in whole or in 
part. To preserve the integrity of the administrative process and ensure 
that plaintiffs are made whole when pursuing valid claims, we propose 
that Washington courts equitably toll the statute of limitations while a 
plaintiff pursues administrative remedies. 
 
                                                      
190. Haghighi, 178 Wash. 2d at 448, 309 P.3d at 466. 
191. Id. 
